
















I use the term “negative causation” to refer to the kind of token causation that involves absences of events as causes or effects. I use the term “positive causation”, by contrast, to refer to the kind of token causation involving events as causes or effects. Most discussions of token causation concentrate on positive causation, but recently negative causation has received increased attention because it seems to refute many philosophical generalizations about token causation. 
For example, one thesis it appears to refute is the widely endorsed thesis to the effect that token causal relations supervene on the overall structure of processes in the actual world. This is actually not a single thesis, but really a family of theses corresponding to different ways of understanding the notion of a process. For example, a version of the thesis is endorsed by the theories of Wesley Salmon (1994) and Philip Dowe (2000), which construe processes in terms of the preservation of physical quantities such as energy or momentum. A version is also implied by the theory of Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver (2000) that takes causal relations to consist in mechanisms that produce regular changes in systems. Similarly, a version of the thesis is accepted by theories that suppose that causal relations are intrinsic relations (Peter Menzies 1996). Finally, primitivist theories that take causation to involve some unanalyzable relation of “biff” (D.M. Armstrong 2004) also embrace a version of the thesis.
The problem that negative causation presents for such theories emerges most clearly in cases of so-called “double prevention” (Ned Hall 2004) or “causation by disconnection” (Jonathon Schaffer, 2000). In these cases an event c prevents some other event d, the occurrence of which would prevent a third event e. In other words, an event c causes the absence of the event d, which in turn causes the event e. Here is one example described by Hall (2004). Suzy is piloting a bomber and Billy is piloting a fighter as her escort. Billy shoots down an enemy plane, which would have otherwise shot down Suzy and prevented her from carrying out her bombing mission, which in fact she successfully completes. Most people report that Billy’s firing is a cause of the bombing. Indeed, the bombing is counterfactually dependent on the firing in that if Billy had not fired, the bombing would not have occurred. But the problematic thing from the point of view of the thesis that causal statements are made true by the existence of processes is that there is no process connecting Billy’s firing with Suzy’s bombing: there is no spatiotemporally continuous chain of events, nor is there any transfer of energy or momentum from the first event to the second.
This is not just a problem in the metaphysics of causation. For cases of double prevention, and negative causation more generally, abound in certain areas of science, especially biology. James Woodward (2003, p.225) gives the following biological example of double prevention. When lactose is present in the environment of E. coli, it produces enzymes that metabolize the lactose. This happens because there are structural genes that code for these enzymes as well as an operator region that controls the access of the RNA polymerase to the structural genes. In the absence of the lactose, a regulatory gene is active which produces a repressor protein, which binds to the operator for the structural genes, thus preventing transcription. In the presence of lactose, allolactose, an isomer formed from lactose, binds to the repressor, inactivating it and thereby preventing it from repressing the operator, so that transcription proceeds. This is clearly a case of double prevention, for lactose induces transcription by interfering with the operation of the agent that would otherwise prevent the transcription.  Once more there is not any spatiotemporally continuous process connecting the activity of the lactose with the production of the enzymes. 
How should we try to understand double prevention and negative causation more generally? A view that has become increasingly popular is that there are in fact two concepts of causation: a concept encompassing positive causation and a concept encompassing negative causation. In some versions of this position, the first concept is claimed to be primary and the other derivative from it (Dowe 2000). In other versions, the two concepts are claimed to be fundamentally distinct and unrelated (Hall 2004).
One aim of this paper is to argue that this view is mistaken. In section 2 I examine Hall’s version of the view, arguing that there are important cases that elude his classification of kinds of causation, and further that it is much more plausible to think that there is a unitary concept of causation that applies uniformly to negative and positive causation alike.  The other aim of this paper is to show how the structural equations approach pioneered by Judea Pearl (2000) can be adapted to provide a unified account of causation. In section 3 I sketch the outlines of a structural equations theory of positive causation and in section 4 show how it carries over smoothly to negative causation. 
This last section returns to the issue of the thesis that token causal relations supervene on the overall structure of processes, i.e. spatiotemporally continuous chains of positive occurrences. In opposition, I argue that cases of pre-emptive prevention show that token causal relations fail to supervene even on the sum total of positive and negative occurrences of the actual world. 

2.	Two Concepts of Causation?
As mentioned already, Hall  (2004) has argued that there are really two fundamentally different kinds of causation. One kind of causation, which he calls production, encompasses positive causation, while the other kind, which he calls dependence, encompasses negative causation. A productive causal relation holds between events when one event generates, brings about or produces another, while a dependence relation holds between facts when one fact counterfactually depends on the other (where counterfactual dependence is construed in terms of non-backtracking counterfactuals). It is crucial to Hall’s characterization of dependence that the facts that can enter into a dependence relation may include facts about the absences of events. The two kinds of causation are fundamentally different. Production differs from dependence in being transitive; in being local in the sense that productive causes are connected to their effects via spatiotemporally continuous processes; and in being intrinsic in the sense that productive causal relations supervene on intrinsic character of these processes (together with the laws). 
Hall’s arguments for these claims are based on the following basic dilemma. On the one hand, certain kinds of pre-emption show that the concept of causation involves the idea that the cause is linked to its effects by transitive, intrinsic, local processes. For what distinguishes a pre-empting actual cause from a pre-empted potential cause is that the first, but not the second, is linked to the effect by such a process. On the hand, Hall argues, examples of double prevention, and more generally any kind of negative causation, show that a cause need not be linked to its effect by any such process. In order to resolve this dilemma, Hall posits the existence of two concepts or kinds of causation—production and dependence. These concepts or kinds coincide in extension for the most part, but they come apart in special cases. Examples of overdetermination illustrate how a productive causal relation can hold between events without a dependence holding between them, while examples of double prevention illustrate how a dependence relation can hold between facts (and the events they describe) without the existence of a productive causal relation. 
Despite its initial plausibility, I believe that Hall’s approach is mistaken. First, there are certain cases of causation that fall outside his taxonomy. He himself describes one such case, which is a modification of his example about Billy, Suzy and the bombing mission. Hall 2004, p.271)  In this example, there is a second fighter plane escorting Suzy; Billy shoots down the enemy fighter exactly as before; but if he had not done so, the second escort would have. As we have seen, this example is an example of double prevention. But it is also an example of pre-empted prevention: Billy’s preventive action pre-empts the second escort’s preventive action. Our causal intuitions are as clear about this example as they were about the original example:  Billy’s firing, but not the action of the second escort, is a cause of Suzy’s successful bombing mission. However, as we have seen in such cases of double prevention, there is no spatiotemporally continuous chain of events linking Billy’s firing with the Suzy’s bombing. Nor, thanks to the presence of a back-up preventer, is there a counterfactual dependence between Billy’s firing and Suzy’s bombing: even if Billy had not shot down the enemy fighter, the second escort would have done so, enabling Suzy to complete her bombing mission. Hence the example shows that some causal relations need not conform to either of Hall’s models of production or dependence. 
A second, more important reason for rejecting Hall’s approach is that it introduces distinctions in our thinking that we do not make. Hall says that if one event causes another by production, that is causation in one sense; whereas if one event causes another in a case of double prevention, that is causation in a different sense. But, as Lewis (2004) points out, we are not always in a position to know whether the causation we have in mind is one kind or the other. For example, pressing a button on top of a black box makes a bomb explode. Perhaps the button is linked inside the black box to an electrical current connected to a detonator on the bomb, so that we have an example of productive causation. Or perhaps pressing the button disconnects an electrical current inside the black box that was inhibiting an independent source from triggering the explosion, so that we have an example of double prevention. (See Lewis 2004 and Schaffer 2000 for more examples of this kind.) Quite evidently we apply the causal concept to this case, saying that the pressing the button caused the bomb to explode, without paying any heed to whether it is by production or double prevention. The causal concept, it would appear, is neutral or non-committal about the nature of the underlying mechanisms, in particular about whether they must involve chains of positive occurrences only. 

3.	The Structural Equations Approach to Positive Causation
In this section I shall briefly sketch how the structural equations framework can be applied to positive causation as a preliminary to showing how it can be applied to negative causation. The application of this framework to token causation has been pioneered by Judea Pearl (2000) and his collaborator David Halpern  (Halpern and Pearl 2001). Christopher Hitchcock (2001) and James Woodward (2003) have helped to me this work accessible to philosophers. I shall not, however, expound the particular theory of token causation developed by Halpern and Pearl, but shall focus instead on a theory advanced in Menzies (2004) as an improvement over Halpern and Pearl’s. This theory, as with all such theories in the structural equations framework, assumes that causation is deterministic.  
The structural equations approach to token causation relativizes the truth-conditions of causal judgements and claims to a causal model. A causal model is an ordered triple <U,V, E>, where U is a set of exogenous variables whose values are determined by factors outside the model; V is a set of endogenous variables whose values are determined by factors within the model; and E is a set of structural equations that express the value of each endogenous variable as a function  of the values of the other variables in U and V.  
It is best to illustrate the approach by way of an example. It will be instructive to consider the example of late pre-emption discussed by Hall (2004).  The example concerns Billy and Suzy again, but at much younger age. They are throwing rocks at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first and shatters the bottle. But Billy’s throw, like Suzy’s, was perfectly accurate so that his rock would have shattered the bottle if Suzy’s had not. 
 A causal model represents this example in terms of a set of selected variables. To represent this example let us choose the five variables ST, BT, SH, BH, and BS, having the following interpretations: 

ST = 1 if Suzy throws a rock, 0 if not.
BT = 1 if Billy throws a rock, 0 if not.
SH = 1 if Suzy’s rock hits the intact bottle, 0 if not.
BH = 1 if Billy’s rock hits the intact bottle, 0 if not.
BS = 1 if the bottle shatters during, 0 if not. 

In this example the variables are all binary variables that take the values 1 or 0, representing the presence or absence of an event. The exogenous variables in this set are ST and BT; and the endogenous variables are SH, BH, and BS. 
The values of the exogenous variables are assumed to be out of the control of the modeller and are typically set at their actual values. On the other hand, the values of endogenous variables are determined by the structural equations in the set E on the basis of the values of the exogenous variables and other endogenous variables. Each endogenous variable has its own structural equation, representing an independent causal mechanism by which its values are determined. The structure of the causal mechanism in the example of late pre-emption can be captured using the following three structural equations:

SH = ST
BH = BT & ~SH
BS = SH v BH

(Note that we are using familiar symbols from logic to represent mathematical functions on binary variables in the obvious way: ~X = 1–X; X v Y = max{X, Y}; and X & Y = min{X, Y}.) A structural equation should be thought of as encoding a battery of non-backtracking counterfactuals. The convention for reading an equation is that the variables appearing on the right-hand side of an equation figure in the antecedents of the corresponding counterfactuals, and those appearing on the left-hand side figure in the consequents. Each equation asserts several counterfactuals, one for each assignment of the variables that makes the equation true. For example, the first of these equations above encodes two counterfactuals, one for each possible value of ST: it asserts that if Suzy threw a rock, her rock hit the bottle; and if she didn’t throw a rock, her rock didn’t hit the bottle. 
The structural equations of a model must meet certain adequacy conditions for the model to count as a satisfactory representation of the actual causal situation. First, the structural equation for a given variable X must include as arguments all and only the variables in the model on which X counterfactually depends, given the values of the other variables. Secondly, the structural equations of a model must be true in the sense that all the counterfactuals they encode must be true. Thirdly, a structural equation for a variable must be invariant in the sense that it continues to hold even when the values of one or more of its arguments are fixed by interventions. (For more on this see Woodward 2003.)
In addition to the concept of a model, a number of other concepts are required to given an account of token causation. Two key notions are captured in the following definition:
 
Definition 1: A pathway between two variables X and Y in a model <U,V,E> is an ordered sequence of variables <X, Z1,…,Zn,Y> such that each variable in the sequence is in U  V and appears on the right-hand side of the structural equation for its successor in the sequence.  A realization of such a pathway is an ordered sequence of states  <X=x, Z1=z1,…,Zn=zn,Y=y>, each of which consists in a variable in the pathway having a specific value.

It is a consequence of this definition that the nature of a pathway between two variables depends on the set of variables selected for use in the model. For example, the set of variables used in the model above allow us to identify the pathway from ST to BS as <ST, SH, BS> and the pathway from BT to BS as  <BT, BH, BS>. However, these pathways would have been simpler if the set of variables had not included SH and BH. This may appear to make the notion of a pathway and its realizations dependent in a somewhat arbitrary way on the representational choices made by the modeller. However, to minimize this arbitrariness I shall adopt an assumption that it is possible, in principle if not in practice, to interpolate intervening variables between any two adjacent variables in a pathway. This assumption will allow us to make a pathway more complex where necessary to ensure that causal processes are described realistically. In any case, this assumption will be congenial to the advocates of the view that mechanisms underlie all causal relations. 
Some more concepts that will be important to our account of causation are the notion of the default values of the exogenous variables, the notion of a default course of evolution for a system, and the notion of a default model. Theories of token causation within a structural equations framework typically set the values of the exogenous variables at their actual values. However, it is an important to the theory under consideration that it sets the values of exogenous variables at certain non-actual default values. Very informally, the default values of these variables represent what it is for the system being modelled to be in its normal initial state. What is normal for a system is determined by a range of factors: sometimes by mere statistical frequency of occurrence, sometimes by the design or function of the system, and sometimes even by ethical or cultural norms and rules. The examples given below will help to make this idea clear. Almost invariably the default values of the exogenous variables are not explicitly stated in causal claims and have to read off from the context. (See Menzies 2006 for discussion of the context-sensitivity of default values.) Given the default values of the exogenous variables, the structural equations of a model determine the default values for all the other variables. These values, taken together, represent the default course of evolution for the system being modelled: this is the way the system would normally evolve from its normal initial state without further intervention from outside the system. Finally, a model with the default setting of its exogenous variables (or a default model for short), is simply a model, as defined above, with an explicit specification of a set of non-actual default values for the exogenous variables.  Such a default model will be written <U*, V, E>, with the variables in U* set at their default values. 
The last concept we need to define causation is the notion of a state activating a pathway. 

Definition 3: Let <X, Z1,…,Zn,Y> be a pathway between X and Y. Then the state X=x activates this pathway to Y=y with respect to the default model <U*, V, E> if and only if feeding X=x into the structural equations E while holding fixed the default values of all exogenous variables (bar X if it is exogenous) yields a realization <X=x, Z1 =z1,…, Zn=zn, Y=y>, where each of these values differs from the value the corresponding variable has in the default course of evolution for the system in question. Let us call this the test realization of the pathway.

Given this concept, we can define causation in the following terms: 

Definition 4: X=x is a cause of Y=y with respect to the default model <U*, V, E> if and only if (i) X=x activates a pathway to Y=y; and (ii) the test realization of this pathway obtains in the actual world.  

This pair of definitions aims to capture the idea that Hart and Honoré take to be central to the commonsense concept of causation:

The notion that a cause is essentially something which interferes with or intervenes in the course of events which would normally take place, is central to the commonsense concept of cause…Analogies with the interference by human beings with the natural course of events in part control, even in cases where there is literally no human intervention, what is identified as the cause of some occurrence: the cause, though not a literal intervention, is a difference to the normal course which accounts for the difference in the outcome. (Hart and Honoré 1985, p.29)

The idea is that a cause is like an action that is an interference or intervention that makes a difference to the normal course of events. Such an action initiates a sequence of states that are quite different from those that would normally obtain. By analogy, a cause makes a difference to its effect by activating a sequence of states leading to the effect that differ from those that would normally occur.  Of course, this is only an analogy: a cause is not always a human intervention or the product of a human intervention. But the analogy is effective because the idea of a cause as being like a difference-making intervention can guide our imaginations in thinking and reasoning about causal structures. For instance, in judging whether something is a cause of some effect, we can imagine what would happen if someone were to intervene in the normal course of events to produce the putative cause; and then compare this imaginatively projected sequence of states with the sequence that we actually find in reality. Talk of models, default values, and states activating pathways is simply a theoretical way of reproducing and regimenting this reasoning process. 
Let us see how these definitions apply to our example of pre-emption as modelled above. Let us suppose that the default value of the exogenous variable ST is 0 and that of BT is 0 as well. On the basis of these values, the structural equations fix the default values for the other variables SH, BH, and BS at 0. This assumption implies that the normal course of evolution for the system is one in which neither Suzy nor Billy throws a rock and the bottle remains intact. Applying Definitions 3 and 4 to the corresponding default model, we can see that the state ST=1 activates up a pathway to BS=1, namely the pathway whose test realization is <ST=1, SH=1, BS=1>; and similarly, the state BT=1 activates a pathway to BS=1, namely the pathway whose test realization is <BT=1, BH=1, BS=1>. The contrast in causal status between these states comes out because the test realization activated by ST=1 matches what we find in reality, whereas the test realization activated by BT=1 does not. In other words, we find in reality the sequence of states that we would expect if Suzy intervened in the normal course of evolution by throwing a rock but not the sequence of states that we would expect if Billy intervened in the normal course of evolution by throwing a rock. 
In this example, it turns out that the test realization of the pathway activated by ST=1 and the test realization of the pathway activated by BT=1 both involve values of variables that correspond to positive occurrences or events. This is the way things generally turn out in cases of positive causation.  But, as we shall see in the next section, it is not true of all cases of causation. 

4.	The Approach Applied to Negative Causation
In this section we shall see show how the proposed definition of causation applies smoothly to cases of negative causation. For illustrative purposes, let us consider Hall’s example of double prevention involving Suzy on her bombing mission with Billy as escort.  
Let us use a fairly simple model to reason about the causal structure of this example. In particular, let us use the following variables, interpreted thus:

S1 =1 if Suzy flies her bomber in interval i, 0 if not.
S2= 1 if Suzy flies her bomber in interval j, 0 if not.
S3 = 1 if Suzy releases bombs in interval k, 0 if not.
E1 = 1 if enemy fighter sights Suzy’s bomber in interval i, 0 if not.
E2 = 1 if enemy fighter shoots down Suzy’s bomber in interval j, 0 if not.
B =1 if Billy fires on enemy fighter in interval i, 0 if not.
 
The exogenous variables are S1, E1, and B. The values of the endogenous variables S2, S3 and E2 are determined by these structural equations: 

S2 = S1
S3 = S2 & ~ E2
E2 = E1 & ~B

The causal judgement to be vindicated here is that Billy’s firing was a cause of Suzy’s bombing because it prevented the enemy fighter’s shooting down her bomber, which event would have prevented her bombing. The first step in seeing whether this causal judgement can be vindicated within this model is to determine the default settings of the exogenous variables. Let us assume that the default settings correspond to states in which Suzy flies her bomber in interval i, the enemy fighter sights her in this interval, but Billy does not fire on the enemy fighter in this interval. This set of assumptions is fairly characteristic of the default assumptions made in cases of prevention. In order to understand how something can prevent an event from occurring, we have to assume that the default situation is one in which some process will normally bring about the event. For example, dousing a house fire with water prevents the fire from spreading because the contrasting default situation is one in which the undoused fire spreads to other parts of the house.  In our double prevention example, the process that is underway in the default situation—the enemy fighter scouting for Suzy’s bomber and shooting it down—has the special feature that it will eventually inhibit another process that is also underway—i.e. Suzy’s bombing mission. This fact means that the default values of the variables S1 and E1 must be set at 1. On the other hand, the default value of the causal variable B must be set at 0, because it must have a different value from its actual value. So, in sum, the default course of evolution for the system is one in which Suzy flies her bomber, the enemy fighter sights her, Billy does not fire at the enemy fighter, the enemy fighter shoots down Suzy’s bomber, and Suzy does not release her bombs. 
Given this default course of evolution, it is easy to see that B=1 activates a pathway to S3, namely the pathway <B, E2, S3>: for the test realization of this pathway is <B=1, E2=0, S3=1>, where these values are different from the values the variables take in the default course of evolution:  i.e. B=0, E2=1, and S3=0. As it happens, this test realization matches what happens in reality so that we can count B=1 as a cause of S3=1. In this case, the test realization does not consist of positive events entirely, for the intermediate state E2=0 corresponds to the failure of the enemy fighter to shoot down Suzy’s bomber. This is one respect in which the application of the theory to cases of negative causation differs from the application of the theory to positive causation: the pathways activated in cases of negative causation invariably involve absences of events. There is no need, however, to appeal to multiple concepts of causation to explain this difference. A univocal concept of causation that is defined in terms of the activation of a pathway allows for the fact that activated pathways may differ in nature from one kind of case to another. 
Recall that the basic thrust of Hall’s argument for the two concepts of causation was that the concept of production is needed to account for pre-emption and the concept of dependence to account for double prevention. As we saw earlier, Hall’s account runs aground when it comes to examples that involve both pre-emption and double prevention. Let us reconsider the modified example in which there is a second escort—let us call him Ned—there to protect Suzy if Billy fails. The model we have just described must be amended to incorporate the presence of Ned as a back-up preventer. We need to introduce two variables: 

N1 =1 if Ned sights the enemy fighter in interval i, 0 otherwise.
N2 = 1 if Ned shoots down the enemy fighter in interval j; 0 otherwise.

We also need to amend the structural equation for E2 and add a structural equation for N2 as follows:

E2 = E1 & ~B & ~N.
N2 = N1 & ~B. 

Hall’s theory has difficulty with this example because while Billy’s firing is a cause of Suzy’s bombing, there is neither a relation of production or dependence (due to the presence of the back-up preventer Ned) between these events. On the other hand, it is easy to see that if we assume that the default value for N1 and for B alike is 0, then none of the amendments of the model affect the reasoning by which B=1 counts as a cause of S3=1. Nonetheless, it is natural to ask whether in this changed model N1=1 comes out as a cause of S3=1. The answer is negative. For with the default values of the exogenous variables fixed in this way, we can see that N1=1 activates a pathway to S3=1. The test realization of this pathway is < N1=1, N2 =1, E2=0, S3=1>, where these values differ from those of the default sequence < N1=0, N2 =0, E2=1, S3=0>. But the crucial point is that this test realization does not match what happened in reality. For what actually happened was that Ned didn’t fire on the enemy fighter — N2 =0 in actual fact—and so Ned’s action does not count as a cause of Suzy’s bombing. 
As this example illustrates, what happens in reality is crucially important to whether one state causes another: the definition of causation requires that the test realization of a pathway activated by the cause must match the sequence of states obtaining in reality, though the states may correspond to negative as well as positive occurrences. Still the match with reality is not the only important element of the definition. Indeed, it is possible to change the causal status of some state simply by changing the default values of some of the variables in the model. For example, in the modified example with Ned as the back-up escort fighter, our initial supposition was that the default value of the exogenous variable N1 was 0. But now let us change this. Let us emphasize Ned’s reliability and determination in his role as an escort to Suzy on her bombing mission. Suppose that he has been charged with the responsibility of keeping a very close eye on Suzy and ensuring that whatever happens no enemy fighter gets close enough to her bomber to endanger its mission. In other words, let us suppose that the default value of N1 is 1 rather than 0.
However, we will not suppose any change in the way things actually turn. As before, it transpires that Billy shoots down the enemy fighter, Ned does not need to shoot, and Suzy’s mission is successful. While there is no change in what happens in fact, there is a change in whether Billy’s firing counts as a cause of Suzy’s mission. The crucial point is that, with this new assignment of default value for N1, B=1 does not activate a pathway to S3=1, since the test realization <B=1, E2=0, S3=1> does not differ from the default realization at the point E2=0. This can be expressed by saying that Billy’s firing does not cause the Suzy’s bombing because the enemy fighter would have been shot down by Ned if not by Billy. 
This simple example illustrates that whether something is a cause of something else does not depend entirely on the sum total of positive and negative occurrences of the actual world: it also depends on what would happen under a contextually determined hypothesis about the default course of evolution for the system under consideration. 
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